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Pragmatic Approach to Problems of Group Law
Practice
Herschel Kriger*
r " QUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW" is inscribed on the facade of the United
"EStates Supreme Court Building in Washington.
This principle has been illustrated in numerous decisions in recent
years, adapting to the needs and mores of a primarily industrial com-
munity of 200,000,000 people, a legal structure which was founded as a
small town agricultural society. Thus, the Supreme Court has declared
itself anew on civil rights, the relationship between the individual and
his government, of individuals inter se, between employer and employee,
between producer and consumer, and in other areas. The process is a
continuing one and draws its essence from the ability of the Court to
find new meaning in constitutional provisions which have proved ap-
plicable to the needs of the nation as it faces problems not specifically
envisaged by the Founding Fathers.
United Mine Workers of America, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar
Association,' is one of the latest in a line of holdings which have demon-
strated that areas heretofore considered by the Bar as sacrosanct unto
itself or the state courts are not immune from re-evaluation. That de-
cision, rendered on December 5, 1967, was not unexpected in the light
of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in NAACP v. Button,
2
and Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar Association,3 and the process
is likely to continue. 4
The Mine Workers Case
In Mine Workers the Court had before it an appeal from an order
by the Illinois Court5 enjoining the Union from engaging in certain
practices alleged to violate the Canons of Legal Ethics. The practice
complained of was described by Justice Black as follows:
The union employs one attorney on a salary basis to represent
members and their dependents in connection with claims for per-
sonal injury and death under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation
* Member of the Bar; Canton, Ohio.
1 389 U.S. 216 (1967).
2 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
3 377 U.S. 941 (1964).
4 F. William McAlpin, of St. Louis, Chairman of a bar association committee study-
ing the problems of providing legal services at lower expense to the public, observed
that his committee expected that the Supreme Court would rule as it did in Mine
Workers. (New York Times, Dec. 6, 1967.)
5 Illinois State Bar Association v. United Mine Workers of America, District 12,
35 Ill.2d 112, 219 N.E.2d 503 (1966).
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Act. The terms of the attorney's employment, as outlined in a
letter from the acting president of the Union, to the present attor-
ney, included the following provision: "You will receive no further
instructions or directions and have no interference from the District,
nor from any officer, and your obligations will be to and with only
the parties you represent." The record shows no departure from
this agreement. The Union provides injured members with forms
entitled "Report to Attorney on Accidents" and advises them to fill
out these forms and send them to the Union's legal department.
There is no language on the form which specifically requests the
attorney to file with the Industrial Commission an application for
adjustment of claim on behalf of the injured member, but when
one of these forms is received, the attorney presumes that it does
constitute such a request. The members may employ other counsel
if they desire, and in fact the Union attorney frequently suggests
to members that they can do so. In that event the attorney is under
instructions to turn the member's file over to the new lawyer im-
mediately.
The applications for adjustment of claim are prepared by secre-
taries in the Union offices, and are then forwarded by the secre-
taries to the Industrial Commission. After the claim is sent to the
Commission, the attorney prepares his case from the file, usually
without discussing the claim with the member involved. The at-
torney determines what he believes the claim to be worth, presents
his views to the attorney for the respondent coal company during
prehearing negotiations, and attempts to reach a settlement. If an
agreement between opposing counsel is reached, the Union attorney
will notify the injured member, who then decides, in light of his
attorney's advice, whether or not to accept the offer. If no settle-
ment is reached, a hearing is held before the Industrial Commission,
and unless the attorney has had occasion to discuss a settlement
proposal with the member, this hearing will normally be the first
time the attorney and his client come into personal contact with
each other. It is understood by the Union membership, however,
that the attorney is available for conferences on certain days at
particular locations. The full amount of any settlement or award
is paid directly to the injured member. The attorney receives no
part of it, his entire compensation being his annual salary paid by
the Union. (Emphasis ours) 0
The Illinois court had distinguished Railroad Trainmen on the
theory that the plan there approved, whereby the Union had referred
members to specific approved attorneys for the handling of claims under
the Federal Employees Liability Act, did not include the explicit hiring
of counsel by the Union for its members. And it distinguished Button
on the theory that, although the NAACP referred members and non-
members to counsel paid by the Union, nevertheless the employment
only involved litigation of political rights. The court rejected the dis-
tinction, noting:
6 United Mine Workers v. Illinois, supra note 1 at 219-221.
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We do not think our decisions in Trainmen and Button can be so
narrowly limited. We hold that freedom of speech, assembly and
petition guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments gives
petitioner the right to hire attorneys on a salary basis to assist its
members in the assertion of their legal rights.7
The court thus overrode the dissent of Justices Clark and Harlan
in Railroad Trainmen that Button only could be applied to matters of
''political expression" and that the majority "relegates the practice of
law to the level of a commercial enterprise" and the dissent of Justices
Harlan, Clark and Stewart in Button based on concern that the decision
''presents a danger of harm to the public interest in a regulated bar."
The majority, of course, was aware of the problems of legal ethics
presented, for it stated, as it had stated in Railroad Trainmen, "That
the States have broad power to regulate the practice of Law is, of
course, beyond question." 8 But it went on to say, consistent with the
earlier decisions, that:
But it is equally apparent that broad rules framed to protect the
public and to preserve respect for the administration of justice
can in their actual operation impair the value of associational free-
doms.9
The Mine Workers Union also was aware of the ethical problems in-
volved, for that plan carefully provided: 10
a. No instructions or directions from the District or any officer after
the referral of the accident report form;
b. Counsel's obligations and relations were to and with only the
persons represented;
c. The members might employ other counsel, if they desire, and
the Union attorney often suggested just that and then turned the file
(with the accident report form) over to such other counsel;
d. While the attorney often did not see the member until the hear-
ing, he was available for conferences on specific days at particular
locations;
e. Neither the union nor the attorney received any part of the
recovery, the entire amount of which was paid directly to the injured
member;
f. The Union did not provide legal services to any non-member;
g. And, underlying the entire plan, by a situation in which the
Union, as an institution, was vitally interested-proper recovery of
7 Ibid. at 221-222.
8 Id. at 222.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 220-221.
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damages for its members injured in industrial accidents or through
industrial disease, or for their dependents in the case of death, without
diminution by attorney's fees.
The Button Case
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
faced with the necessity of enforcing civil rights of Negroes, specifically
to end segregation in the schools of Virginia, found a dearth of lawyers
willing or able to assume such litigation. The reason for the reluctance
of Virginia counsel to act on behalf of individuals in such cases is
obvious. After the 1955 Supreme Court decision declaring school segre-
gation illegal per se, n organizations seeking to enforce the decision also
found themselves faced with a 1956 Virginia statute which, inter alia,
added to existing legislation controlling the practice of law a definition
of a "runner" or "capper" to include an "agent for an individual or
organization which retains a lawyer in connection with an action to which
it is not a party and in which it has no pecuniary right or liability."
NAACP sued, attacking the constitutionality of the objected-to section
and its application to the activities of the Association. The matter came
before the Supreme Court on appeal from decision by the Virginia Court
sustaining the section.12
The significant activities of the NAACP, approved by the Supreme
Court, were essentially as follows:
1. The Virginia conference of NAACP ordinarily will finance only
a litigant who retains a member of the NAACP legal staff to represent
him;
2. Ordinary damage actions, criminal actions in which no possibility
of racial discrimination exists or in which the complainant seeks separate
but equal instead of fully desegregated school facilities are not handled;
3. The litigant may or may not be a member of NAACP and the
Virginia conference decides who is entitled to assistance;
4. Members of the NAACP legal staff are generally paid on a per
diem basis plus expenses in each case and the staff member may not
accept any other remuneration from the litigant or otherwise;
5. The per diem rate is smaller than that customary for private
professional work. The litigation is under the control of the attorney,
although the NAACP remains concerned that the outcome of the litiga-
tion be consistent with NAACP policy.
6. The client is free at any time to withdraw from an action.
7. Litigation is commenced in several ways- (a) an aggrieved
11 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1955).
12 N.AA.C.P. v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 116 S.E.2d 55 (1960).
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Negro may apply for such help to the NAACP and the application is
referred to the legal staff. (b) In school segregation cases a local
NAACP branch would invite a legal staff member to explain to a meet-
ing of parents and children the legal steps necessary to achieve desegre-
gation. The staff member brings with him printed forms authorizing him
and other NAACP attorneys to represent them in such litigation.
8. Thus the prospective litigant retains, not an individual attorney,
but rather a "firm" of NAACP attorneys which has expertise in such
questions of law.
9. The meetings sometimes are prompted by letters and bulletins
urging active steps to achieve desegregation, and by distribution of
petitions among persons willing to engage in litigation. While the
NAACP encourages the bringing of such suits, the plaintiffs in particu-
lar actions make their own decisions to sue.
Answering the finding of the Virginia court that these activities
were in violation of the statute on the ground that this constituted
fomenting and soliciting legal business in which they are not
parties and have no pecuniary right or liability, and which they
channel to the enrichment of certain lawyers employed by them, at
no cost to the litigants and over which the litigants have no con-
trol.13
Justice Brennan held for the majority that:
We hold that the activities of the NAACP . . . are modes of ex-
pression and association which Virginia may not prohibit, under
its power to regulate the legal profession . . .14
He parenthetically noted that the right of political expression is not
limited to Negro organizations seeking redress of their grievances but
also had been used by opponents of New Deal legislation in the 30's, i.e.,
The Liberty League, which was held by a Bar Association Committee
not to have engaged in unprofessional conduct in assisting such litiga-
tion.15 In essence, he held that NAACP had the right, not only to
engage in litigation on its own behalf, but to solicit and to support
litigation, for its members and others, for:
. . . the litigation it assists, while seeking to vindicate the legal
rights of members of the American Negro community, at the same
time and perhaps more importantly, makes possible the distinctive
contribution of a minority group to the ideas and beliefs of our
society. For such a group, association for litigation may be the
most effective form of political association.
16
13 N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, supra note 2 at 426.
14 Ibid. at 428-429.
15 Id. at 430 n. 13.
16 Id. at 431.
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Justice Brennan also was aware of the problems of legal ethics involved
but declined to comment one way or the other on various forms of
group legal activities, even that involved in the Railroad Trainmen
cases,17 thus limiting his opinion to the facts before the court. He did
note, however, that there were no monetary stakes involved nor any
showing of conflict of interest between the aims and interests of the
NAACP and its member or non-member litigants.18
Justice Douglas was more to the point. He noted specifically that
this suit resulted from a massive attack by segregationists to destroy
the fruits of the Supreme Court decision in the school segregation cases.
Justice Harlan's dissent, while expressing awareness of the principles
of free speech and association, drew a line between speech and action
by litigation, stating, in effect, that the latter must remain under tradi-
tional state controls. In view of the limitation by the majority in its find-
ings to the specific facts before it as they involve NAACP, it remained for
later litigation to furnish further meaning. That opportunity came in
Railroad Trainmen.
Railroad Trainmen
In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar,19 the
Supreme Court reviewed an injunction by the Virginia court against
the Union continuing a plan whereby:
1. It maintained a panel of approved regional lawyers selected on
the advice of local lawyers and state and federal judges and who had a
reputation for skill and honesty in representing plaintiffs in railroad
personal injury litigation. 20
2. Its local lodges submitted to its Legal Aid Department reports on
all cases of accidental injury or death of its members.
3. Local lodge officers had the duty of informing injured members
or survivors of the Brotherhood's facilities, to caution them against
settlement without advice of counsel and so that they might avail them-
selves of the services of the approved lawyers if they chose to do so.21
4. Fees were established at 25 per cent of the recovery. Regional
counsel originally remitted part of the fee to the Legal Aid Department
for its maintenance, but later the entire 25 per cent fee was retained by
the regional counsel. However, since 1959, the Brotherhood did not fix
fees of the regional counsel, although the tradition of the 25 per cent
contingent fee continued.
17 Id. at 442 n. 25.
18 Id. at 443.
19 Brotherhood v. Virginia, supra note 3.
20 Ibid. at 4.
21 Id.
Jan. 1969
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol18/iss1/2
PRAGMATIC GROUP LAW PRACTICE
5. It provided a staff at its own expense to gather evidence for use
in the event trial be necessary.
22
6. The plan concededly resulted in channeling railroad personal in-
jury litigation to the regional counsel. 23 All fees were paid by the liti-
gant. The plan encompassed no proceedings other than FELA litiga-
tion.
The Supreme Court held the plan entitled to the constitutional pro-
tections, based on Button, Justice Black stating simply that:
The right of members to consult with each other in a fraternal or-
ganization necessarily includes the right to select a spokesman from
their number who could be expected to give the wisest counsel.
That is the role played by the members who carry out the legal aid
program. And the right of the workers personally or through a
special department of their Brotherhood to advise concerning the
need for legal assistance-and, most importantly, what lawyer a
member could confidently rely on-is an inseparable part of this
constitutional guaranteed right to assist and advise each other.24
And later:
And, of course, lawyers accepting employment under this consti-
tutionally protected plan have a like protection which the State
cannot abridge. 25
So far Railroad Trainmen added little to Button other than recog-
nizing the right of the Union to refer certain legal business of affected
members to approved counsel with the fee to be deducted from the re-
covery on a contingent basis rather than paid by the association. How-
ever, Justice Black implied that there might be further rights which
might be vindicated in such manner in a proper case (such as in Mine
Workers) for he observed:
. . . in Great Britain unions do not simply recommend lawyers to
members in need of advice; they retain counsel, paid by the union,
to represent members in personal lawsuits, a practice similar to that
which we upheld in NAACP v. Button, supra.26
Justice Clark's dissent in Railroad Trainmen feared that the decision:
. . .will be a green light to other groups who for years have at-
tempted to engage in similar practices,
27
noting examples of attempted group practices in automobile litigation
and dental and optical services. This must be read in pari materia with
Justice Brennan's notation (but careful failure not to consider) in
22 Id. at 4 n. 5.
23 Id. at 5.
24 Id. at 6.
25 Id. at 8.
26 Id. at 7.
27 Id. at 12.
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Button of other similar association activities. 2s It is with these impli-
cations that this discussion will deal further.
The Common Thread Running Through the Group Practice Cases
It might be suggested that the law is merely the crystallization of
the conscience of the community based on the needs of the times in
which the problems ,have arisen. And the courts under our constitu-
tional system have proven remarkably adaptable in finding bases in the
Constitution for meeting the needs of the times. Thus we observe:
1. In each case the issue arose as the result of the organization
seeking to vindicate rights of peculiar interest to the group as well as
the individual. For example:
In Button the NAACP faced its organizational obligation to enforce
generally rights of Negroes to non-segregated education conferred by
the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education,
29 in the face of a
calculated program to frustrate effectuation of the decision.
In Railroad Trainmen, the Brotherhood faced its organizational
obligation to enforce for its members rights conferred by the Safety Ap-
pliance Act and the FELA. Justice Black noted the peculiar hardships
of railroad workers which led to the organization of the Brotherhood
in 1883 and its relationship to the statutory rights granted by the Safety
Appliance Act in 1893 and the FELA in 1908.30
In Mine Workers the Union faced its organizational responsibility
of vindicating rights of injured miners or the survivors of deceased
miners to benefits provided under the Illinois Workmen's Compensa-
tion Statute enacted in 1912.
2. Each of these cases arose under conditions where the local bar
in general had not provided or was unable to provide the necessary
service and did not have the necessary expertise or confidence of the
member-beneficiaries.
For example, in Button the Virginia lawyers, as a group, were fear-
ful and unmindful of their professional obligation to defend the rights
of the Negro minority. In fact, they assumed NAACP referrals only on
threat of penalty and disbarment under a statute amended as part of
massive resistance to the decision in Brown. Furthermore, the NAACP
lawyers were expert in a field not generally known to the average
practitioner. 31
28 N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, supra note 2 at 442 n. 25.
29 Supra note 11.
30 Brotherhood v. Virginia, supra note 3 at 233.
31 N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, supra note 2 at 434-435.
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In Railroad Trainmen, we take notice of the fact that railroad work-
ers generally reside in small towns along the railroad right-of-way where
skilled lawyers able to meet railroad counsel on equal terms are not
available and are unknown to them.
In Mine Workers the same principles apply.
3. Each of these cases arose out of the necessity of providing the
remedy to individuals at practical cost, and to place them on a parity
with the massive organizations which would frustrate their claims. All
three plans provided machinery for reporting of claims with competent
investigation by association officials. And the plans provided either for
the service at no cost to the beneficiary or a limitation of the amount of
the fees.
4. All three plans provided protection against practices which would
deprive the members and the other beneficiaries of the fruits of the
statutes or court decision. We need not belabor the difficult position in
which a Virginia lawyer asserting Negro rights would find himself in
the southern environment. In Railroad Trainmen Justice Black said:
It soon became apparent to the railroad workers, however, that
simply having these federal statutes on the books was not enough
to assure that the workers would receive the full benefit of the
compensatory damages Congress intended they should have. In-
jured workers or their families often fell prey on the one hand to
persuasive claims adjusters eager to gain a quick and cheap settle-
ment for their railroad employers, or on the other to lawyers either
not competent to try these lawsuits against the able and experienced
railroad counsel or too willing to settle a case for a quick dollar.3 2
And in Mine Workers he noted:
Shortly after enactment of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation
Statute in 1912, the mine workers realized that some form of mu-
tual protection was necessary to enable them to enjoy in practice
the many benefits that the statute promised in theory. At the Union's
1913 convention the secretary-treasurer reported that abuses had
already developed; "the interests of the members were being juggled
and even when not, they were required to pay forty or fifty per cent
of the amounts recovered in damage suits for attorney fees." 33
Quaere whether the NAACP Legal Services would have been neces-
sary if Virginia had not engaged in a studied campaign to frustrate the
effects of the no-segregation rule? Or if Virginia lawyers had been
willing to provide legal services even if the cause be unpopular? And
quaere whether the Brotherhood plan would have been necessary if the
railroads had- settled FELA claims on an equitable basis and without im-
position? Or if the railroad workers generally had been able to pro-
32 Brotherhood v. Virginia, supra note 3 at 3-4.
33 United Mine Workers v. Illinois, supra note 1 at 219.
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cure expert and fair legal services for the handling of their claims?
And quaere whether the Mine Workers plan would have been neces-
sary had the miners not been subject to the impositions described by
Justice Black? The Supreme Court decisions were pragmatic ones which
met the needs of the time.
The Pragmatic Approach Already Had Been Ingrained in the Law of
Labor Relations
The right of workmen to organize and cooperate for their mutual
interest and protection has been recognized for many years. Back in
1933 the National Industrial Recovery Act, enacted as part of a broad
program of lifting the nation from depression, recognized the right of
workmen to organize and bargain collectively.3i The Norris-LaGuardia
Act in 1932 noted that "the individual unorganized worker is commonly
helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his free-
dom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions
of employment." 35 The National Labor Relations Act in 1935 referred
to "the inequality of bargaining powers between employees who do not
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and
employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of owner-
ship association." 36 While grounded on statutes enacted under the com-
merce clause of the Constitution, it would appear that this right might
as well have been grounded on the First and Fourteenth Amendments
except that such rights then were not fully recognized by court de-
cision. But this concept is not much different from Justice Black's com-
mentary in Railroad Trainmen about the inequality of bargaining power
or individual railroaders and "persuasive claim adjusters" of their em-
ployer in the settlement of their claim. 37 Whereas employees once or-
ganized into unions at the peril of discharge unless their economic
action was sufficient to enforce their grievance (corrected by the
statutes), railroaders often prosecuted their claims individually only
under threat of discharge or refusal to reinstate. 3
Settlement of grievances under union contracts, often involving sub-
stantial sums of money on behalf of individual employees, now is an
essential part of the industrial way of life. Thousands of grievances are
processed annually under union contracts without any reference to the
need for counsel, even to the point that some would require more arbitra-
tion-compulsory arbitration to the exclusion of the right to strike. While
we do not subscribe to compulsory arbitration of new contract terms with
34 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
35 29 U.S.C. § 101-115 (1932).
36 29 U.S.C. § 151-166 (1935).
37 Brotherhood v. Virginia, supra note 3 at 3-4.
38 N.R.A.B. Award 321 (1st Div. 1938); and 149 N.R.A.B. 315 (1st Div. 1961).
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consequent erosion of the Free Enterprise System, the lesson of this
system of voluntary private jurisprudence dealing with grievances
during the term of the contract seems to have been lost on the opponents
of group practice plans. Most arbitrations are conducted by unions
on behalf of employees by their international representatives or local
officers. Substantial justice is done under a system in which the arbi-
trator often is not a lawyer but an industrial engineer, an economist or
just an "arbitrator."
This plan has the blessing of the Supreme Court as the preferred
method of settlement of grievance disputes. Justice Douglas has de-
scribed the arbitration process as "the substitute for industrial strife,"
but without regard to whether or not the litigants are represented by
counsel or even if the arbitrator himself is a member of the Bar.39 At
one time the court seemed to distinguish between so-called union rights
and individual rights, holding that the union had no right to sue under
Section 301 of the Labor Act to vindicate purely personal rights of em-
ployees. 40 However, that concept has since been discarded and the
Court has held that individual rights may be enforced by suit. The
union has an interest in enforcement of the rights guaranteed to the
employees by the contract. 41 But an individual may not sue in the face
of a union contract without exhausting or attempting to exhaust the con-
tractual grievance and arbitration procedure. 42 The result achieved-
a private system of industrial jurisprudence-too, is a pragmatic one,
for it is inconceivable that modern industry could perform its function
without collective bargaining and expeditious and relatively economical
resolution of grievances. There is no expense at all to the employee in
the usual case. The system is of benefit to employer, union and em-
ployee alike.
So, with recognition of this type of group "practice" through an as-
sociation, the decisions in Button, Railroad Trainmen and Mine Workers
logically followed.
The State Courts Had Been Groping for an Answer to Modern Needs
Even prior to the decisions under consideration, state courts had
been groping for an answer. This is illustrated by experience in Ohio.
Some state courts had held that plans which furnished counsel to as-
sociation members, as in Button and Mine Workers, or which referred
39 Examination of cases in the CCH Arbitration Service over a period of several
years shows that in about 28% of the reported awards the union was represented by
counsel.
Steelworkers Trilogy: Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S.
564 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574(1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
40 Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse, 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
41 Smith v. Evening News Association, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
42 Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1963).
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union members to approved counsel, as in Railroad Trainmen, were il-
legal as in conflict with the Canons of Ethics.
43
But Ohio, in recent years, showing more practical thinking, drew
the line, not in blind adherence to tradition, but for the needs of the
times. The line was drawn on whether the services were performed for
profit. In re Brown, Weiss & Wohl,44 the Ohio Supreme Court, while
holding to its position that no agency (either an administrative agency
or the legislature) might define what is the practice of law, nevertheless
stated in Syllabus 3 that:
No person, other than an attorney in good standing may hold him-
self out as being qualified to render service to those who may have
claims for compensation arising under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Laws of Ohio or as being able to render services in the prepara-
tion and presentation of such claims nor may such person render
such advice if a fee for such advice or services is to be received from
or charged against the one having such a claim. (Emphasis ours.) 45
In this case a partnership of laymen conducted a business of representing
workmen's compensation claimants for a fee based on a percentage of
the recovery, respondents claiming that such practice was protected
by Ohio Constitutional provisions establishing the Workmen's Compen-
sation System. The lower court had enjoined all activities relative to
practice before the Industrial Commission of Ohio. The Supreme Court
modified the order, stating:
However, the judgment of the trial court enjoins respondents from
doing those acts complained of instead of, as it probably should
have, merely enjoining them from doing them for a fee . ..To this
extent that judgment should probably be modified. (Emphasis
ours.) 46
Under prior authority, Goodman v. Beal,47 the line had been drawn at
appearance at a "rehearing" where a record of testimony was taken for
use in later trial. All practice prior to the "rehearing" was not the
"practice of law." In Brown, Weiss & Wohl, briefs amicus were filed
on behalf of the Ohio AFL-CIO and the Ohio Chamber of Commerce
and Ohio Manufacturers Association, which brought to the attention
of the court the realities of Industrial Compensation practice whereby
local unions customarily furnish advice and representation to their
members and whereby employees or "actuaries" employed by industrial
43 In re BRT, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E. 2d 162 (1958); Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36
Cal. 2d 504, 225 P. 2d 508 (1950). Also see cases cited by Justice Clark in dissent,
supra note 3 at 1, and those cited in Markus, Group Representation by Attorneys as
Misconduct, 14 Clev-Mar. L. Rev. 1 (1965).
44 175 Ohio St. 149, 23 Ohio Op. 2d 445 (1963).
45 Id. at 149, Syllabus 3.
46 Supra note 44 at 152-153.
47 130 Ohio St. 427, 5 Ohio Op. 52 (1936).
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and business concerns appear for the employer in contesting and ad-
justing such claim. The AFL-CIO noted that it customarily prints
booklets and other literature advising members and their representa-
tives in the intricacies of the Workmen's Compensation Law and that
local unions customarily have non-lawyer members who have become
skilled in handling of such matters-but without any fee. The Consti-
tution of the United Steelworkers of America (14) provides:
A Workmen's Compensation Committee and a Safety and Health
Committee, under the direction of the International Union or its
designated representative, shall be designated in each Local Union.48
Thus, compensation schools are held periodically in which the mem-
bers serving on such committees are educated in the laws and in the
handling of claims for the members. The same procedures are followed
with respect to representation in unemployment compensation claims.
Thus, with the distinction made with respect to no-fee representation,
the Ohio court was prophetic in accepting the plan similar to that later
approved in Mine Workers. The rights of the Bar were vindicated by
drawing the line at charging a fee for representation, and at the same
time the association rights were vindicated by permitting the union to
handle claims for its members. It is interesting that the Ohio Court
did not find it necessary to rely on federal constitutional rights as the
basis for its decision.
In a prior case, in a somewhat different context, Cleveland Bar As-
sociation v. Fleck,49 disciplinary proceedings were brought against law
partners who had entered into a written agreement with a local union
whereby respondents agreed to represent its individual members in
Workmen's Compensation proceedings and permitted and aided in the
distribution among the union members of copies of the contract. The
charging committee alleged "for the purpose of soliciting professional
employment." Respondents were charged with aiding the union mem-
bers in signing the contracts, in preparing their claims and in repre-
senting them before the Industrial Commission. One, it was charged,
appeared before the local union to urge the execution of the basic
employment contract, copies of which were mailed to 8,000 union mem-
bers. Compensation was from the individual recoveries, presumably on
a contingent basis.
While there was one facet dealing with borrowing of money in
order to facilitate payment of the fee, the basic plan differs only in de-
gree from that approved in Mine Workers. The existence of a legal
service plan of this general type, or the fact that announcement was
made to the union membership. do not appear improper under the rule
48 Constitution of United Steelworkers, Art. VI, Sec. 10C (1962).
49 172 Ohio St. 467, 17 Ohio Op. 2d 458; cert. den. 369 U.S. 861 (1961).
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of that case. And the contingent fee arrangement does not appear im-
proper in view of Railroad Trainmen. While the case does not state which
party to the arrangement was the motivating agent, it would seem that
if the union had requested respondent to attend the meeting for the
purpose of explaining the contract to the membership, there would have
been no wrongdoing in that respect. Did respondents have the duty to
tell the union not to make the agreement? But the thrust of the Su-
preme Court's opinion seems to be acceptance of the fact that the re-
spondents' participation in the plan was a violation of the Canons. From
the Court's opinion it does not appear that the constitutional question
later raised in Button, Railroad Trainmen and Mine Workers was be-
fore the Ohio court.
Columbus Bar Association v. Potts,5 0 involved a factual situation
superficially analogous to Railroad Trainmen. There an international
union maintaining a legal aid department had retained New York coun-
sel to handle FELA claims for its members, payment to be made on a
contingent basis. Respondent was retained as their local counsel. Pub-
licity of respondent's availability was given orally at union meetings and
by written publications and notices. Union officials brought injured
workmen to his office where they signed "requests to see counsel" and
contingent fee agreements. So far, the facts appear indistinguishable
in principle from Railroad Trainmen unless we are to find a difference
in the fact that respondent was local correspondent for the actual ap-
proved lawyers in New York or that the union official brought the
plaintiff to see the lawyer.
However, respondent and the legal aid chairman of the local called
at the hospital to see a seriously injured workman who there signed
the "request to see counsel" letter and the contingent fee contract. The
injured employee later rescinded the agreement and it was returned.
As the court saw it, the serious evil in the arrangement was that the
New York counsel were the named attorneys and that the case, while
presumably "forwarded" to New York, actually was handled by re-
spondent with occasional consultation with the New York Counsel. But
this seems a slight variation from the approved plan, if we consider
respondent as the approved agent or associate of the approved New
York counsel. The lesson of the case, in the light of the later Supreme
Court pronouncement, is that the union might refer FELA work to its
approved counsel far away, but such counsel might not maintain an
attorney-agent in a locality to do the local work, hardly a serious dis-
tinction if the referral system in itself be legal as an expression of con-
stitutional rights. Respondent visited the injured workman in the hos-
pital with the legal aid chairman and his indiscretion in that respect and
50 175 Ohio St. 101, 23 Ohio Op. 392 (1963).
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procuring an authorization for approved New York counsel seems to be
the gravamen of the offense.
Interestingly, the constitutional lesson of Button was raised in the
Ohio court, but that defense was struck down because of Justice
Brennan's caveat as expressed in Button in footnote 25, hereinbefore
referred to.
The decision was not appealed to the Supreme Court. Quaere, what
would that court have done with this case in view of its later answer to
Justice Brennan's note in Railroad Trainmen?
The status of such plans as Railroad Trainmen had been considered
by an Ohio appellate court in 1933 in In re Petition of the Committee
on Rule 28 of the Cleveland Bar Association,5 1 and that court, like
most courts of that era, found the plan in violation of the Canons. But
prophetically, a dissenting member of the court considered very much
the same history recited in Railroad Trainmen and held that the Legal
Aid plan did not constitute "soliciting," stating:
The plan of regional counsel conceived by the Brotherhood of Rail-
road Trainmen was meritorious and worthy. It sought to protect
the members of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen against im-
position. It was not tainted with unlawful or unethical elements.
It must follow that since it is lawful and ethical for the Brother-
hood of Railroad Trainmen to employ counsel that it is not unlaw-
ful or unethical for counsel to accept the employment.52
And this was without assistance of the constitutional support used by
the Supreme Court some 30 years later. The change in judicial thought
which has come about as a result of the decisions in Button, Railroad
Trainmen and Mine Workers well might cause the prosecutors in the
earlier cases to have the same afterthoughts which surely faced the
prosecutors of the Salem witches-should they have been hung in the
first instance?
Do the Recent Group Practice Decisions Completely Close the Door on
Traditional Ethical Considerations in Group Practices?
As we have noted, the justices were concerned with the ethical
considerations even though the specific plans before them in the three
cases were approved. Justice Brennan spoke at length on this subject
in Button, but declined to rule beyond the scope of the immediate case. 53
Justices Harlan, Clark and Stewart were concerned in their dissent in
that case, as was Justice Harlan again in Mine Workers. However, we
urge that the Legal Canons still are alive but must be adapted to the
needs of the times and the constitutional protections referred to. No
51 15 Ohio L. Abs. 106 (1933).
52 Id. at 111.
53 N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, supra note 2 at 442 No. 25.
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longer can the Bar blindly follow canons born in an earlier day, with-
out regard to constitutional protections. If the Bar is to properly ful-
fill its function of administering justice for all, it too must grow with
the times and meet the needs of the industrial age. Blind resistance to
change might result in the same fiasco experienced by the American
Medical Association when it resisted group practice.54 As suggested
by Justice Brennan in Button, each case must be considered on its
merits. We thus inquire:
What Is the Scope of Services Which a Union May Provide for Its
Members?
It is significant that all three cases involved association rights and
obligations as well as individual rights. But the union no longer merely
is an organization whose purpose is to win "more" for its members from
the employer. The scope of collective bargaining has expanded widely
in recent years. While an employer has the duty of bargaining on
matters of wages and hours, it also must bargain on "other terms and
conditions of employment.''55 And, by the National Labor Relations
Act, employees have the right to organize "to engage in . . . concerted
activities for the purpose of .. .other mutual aid and protection." 5o
Thus we pose the following questions which come to mind, from the
daily grist of law practice:
1. Inasmuch as employers usually seek some limitation on garnish-
ments, might not a union refer or employ counsel for its members to
represent them in garnishment proceedings to protect their job rights?
Or even in bankruptcies, where necessary?
2. Inasmuch as most insurance agreements limit the employer's li-
ability to furnishing the insurance plan bargained for, leaving the
matter of individual recovery to litigation between the employee and
the insuror, might not a union refer or employ counsel to enforce such
insurance claims so that the employee might have the benefits he an-
ticipates pursuant to the contract?
3. Inasmuch as many employers sub-contract cafeteria and other
food services for the employee, especially in a large plant where outside
food services are not generally adequate, might not a union refer or
employ counsel for suit by employees damaged as result of eating
tainted food?
4. In those cases where an employer has the right to move its
operation, and the plant then is acquired by a new employer, might not
54 American Medical Assoc. v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
55 29 U.S.C. § 158 (8c) (1964).
56 29 U.S.C. § 158 (7) (1964).
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the union refer or employ counsel for suit by employees who claim
residual rights against the old or new employer?
5. Although unemployment compensation generally is a matter be-
tween the state and the individual, might not the union refer or employ
counsel in vindication of the right to unemployment compensation?
There have been numerous mass proceedings litigated by union coun-
sel on behalf of employees in unemployment compensation matters, such
as in the case of the Supplemental Unemployment Benefits suits57 or
the more recent "vacation pay" suits. 58 Or in deciding the question of
whether a plant shutdown was the result of a strike in the "establishl-
ment"? 59 Or in deciding whether an employee attending evening
school is to be thus deprived of his unemployment benefits as a "student
regularly attending an established educational institution"? 60
6. Inasmuch as some contracts contain provisions for providing
meals or company housing, might not a union refer or employ counsel
for suit against the manufacturer of the food or defect in the housing?
Or for suit against a company doctor who is negligent in treatment of
injured employees?
7. Or if a machine or a tool in the shop is defective, might not the
union refer or employ counsel to prosecute suit against the manufacturer
on behalf of an employee injured thereby?
8. Inasmuch as conviction of a crime or incarceration for a specific
period might be grounds for termination, might not the union refer or
employ counsel to defend the employee against the criminal proceed-
ings or to procure his release?
9. Or stretching the analogy further, inasmuch as domestic tran-
quillity has a bearing on an employee's ability to remain on the job,
might a union refer or employ counsel to handle the member's domestic
problems?
The list, of course, might be endless, depending on how far we are
to extend the concept of the employment relationship or the obligation
or interest of the union in regard thereto. Perhaps this inquiry explains
Justice Black's cryptic reference in Railroad Trainmen6 ' to the prac-
tice in Britain to "retain counsel, paid by the union, to represent mem-
bers in personal lawsuits..."
The answer well might be that in Britain, with perhaps a stronger
tradition of trade unionism, the union plays a greater role in the daily
57 United Steel Workers of America v. Doyle, 169 Ohio St. 324, 7 Ohio Op. 2d 11(1958).
58 Nunamaker v. U. S. Steel Corp., 2 Ohio St. 20, 31 Ohio Op. 2d 110 (1963).
5 Abnie v. Ford Motor Co., 175 Ohio St. 273, 25 Ohio Op. 2d 110 (1963).
60 Acierno v. General Fire Proofing Co., 166 Ohio St. 538, 3 Ohio Op. 2d 7 (1957).
61 Brotherhood v. Virginia, supra note 3 at 7, n. 12.
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lives of the members. However, the common thread running through
the foregoing examples is the relation to the employment relationship,
which surely is a legitimate interest of the union.
Some unions already have entered the foregoing or related fields.
As stated, with Ohio Supreme Court approval, unions are providing
representation for members in workmen's compensation and unemploy-
ment matters, even by laymen. Certain Teamsters Locals in St. Louis
provide income tax services to their members during the spring tax-
return season. Auto Workers Local 600 at Detroit provides the same
service.G2 Retail Clerks and Teamsters in California and Carpenters in
New York provide a drug insurance plan.6 3 The Joint Teamsters Coun-
cil at St. Louis maintains a comprehensive medical-dental plan whereby
such services are provided to members either by union-employed per-
sonnel or referral to panel doctors, depending on the gravity of the prob-
lem. And in southern California the Hotel and Restaurant Employees
and Bartenders Union, for a time, maintained a "judicare" program pro-
viding various legal services for members by a panel of approved law-
yers. 64 The list is endless, and illustrates the possibilities which arise as
the union exerts a growing interest in the lives of the members. It well
may be that Justice Black's suggestion as to the British practice is not
far-fetched and that the cases may present a "green light to other groups
who for years have attempted to engage in similar practices," as sug-
gested by Justice Clark in Railroad Trainmen.65
The California Hotel & Restaurant Employees plan offered bail
bond benefits, and legal advice on civil matters, but excluding income
tax problems, domestic relations, matters relating to outside business
activities, and disputes between members and employers and their
unions. Employees who made known their need for legal aid to their
employer or the union were referred to the fund office, and determina-
tion was made as to whether the need fell within the ambit of the plan
and whether the employee was financially unable to employ counsel.
The fund's social worker then inquired whether the employee had an
attorney. If he had counsel, he was referred to his own attorney, who
was advised of the extent of aid which the fund would provide. If he
had no counsel, he was referred to the Lawyers Referral Service; but
if he did not wish such referral, then he was referred to one of the
lawyers on the fund's panel. Interestingly, most of the employees re-
jected the suggestion of referral to the Lawyers Referral Service be-
cause "most of the employees wanted an attorney whom they knew
or who was referred to them by a person they knew and trusted." The
62 Wall Street Journal (Jan. 31, 1968) at 1, Col. E.
63 Wall Street Journal (March 4, 1965) at 1, Col. D.
64 Journal of the State Bar of California (Sept.-Oct. 1964) p. 670 et seq.
65 Brotherhood v. Virginia, supra note 3 at 12.
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plan, though apparently successful, was terminated in 1961 because of
lack of funds to make its availability known and to extend its benefits to
all employed in the industry. 0
Unemployment Compensation referral services similar to that in
Mine Workers are not uncommon.' 7 A teachers association with a mem-
bership of 60,000 maintains a legal fund to provide assistance to mem-
bers in protection of their professional rights. 8
Nor have these systems been limited to unions. Trade associations
have retained counsel on behalf of their members to provide limited
services in connection with the association's activities, on the premise
that such counsel are expert in the area covered-for example, counsel
retained by a landlord's association 9 who gave advice on preparing and
serving eviction notices and filing unlawful detainer actions and similar
matters. Corporations have provided such services for many years.
Usually the corporation refers the problems of its employees to other
counsel or to the Lawyer Referral Service, but one corporation during
the war actually employed lawyers to handle personal problems of its
employees, on the theory that such assistance reduced absenteeism.70
Particular attention was paid to wage garnishments. We assume that
Internal Revenue Service approved such expenditures as being for a
necessary and valid business purpose. And while this particular plan
was terminated with the end of the war, that should not be a con-
sideration of its current validity.
One corporation, opening a plant in a new locality, organized its
own "bar association" and "legal referral service" in order to meet the
needs of its employees who were generally unfamiliar with the local
bar and who knew no lawyers in whom they had confidence. Some
sort of catalytic agency was necessary in order to bridge the gap be-
tween legal needs and the wish of employees to be referred to counsel
in whom they would have confidence.71 A portion of the maritime in-
dustry consisting of small ship-owners formed an association which re-
ferred members to counsel familiar with maritime problems and who
handled individual matters at prescribed charges. 72 And further illus-
trative of what is being done is the Army Legal Assistance Program
established in 1943, which provides advice to servicemen on personal
problems of a civil nature, without charge. If court action is desired,
the legal assistance officer refers the client to lawyer reference or a
66 Supra note 64 at 674.
67 Ibid.
68 Id. at 675.
69 Id. at 678.
70 Id. at 679.
71 Id. at 682.
72 Id. at 684.
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local bar association.73 The Canton Automobile Club, apparently as
part of the AAA general service, provides bail bonds for its members
arrested in traffic cases, and also pays legal fees under a present
schedule for defense of specified traffic violations. The plan provides,
however, for mere reimbursement of legal fees pursuant to the schedule,
and does not purport to set the fee, and the AAA does not even assist in
the selection of counsel.
Guidelines for the Future
As we have noted, running through the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in the three cases is recognition that application of the Canons of
Legal Ethics is important and must be observed. The rules are not dead,
yet the Court has made it clear that it will not permit rules as defined
in an earlier environment to stand in the way of the First and Four-
teenth Amendment Rights applicable to the needs of a modern industrial
and urban society. We do not believe that labor unions or any other
institutions wish to usurp the practice of law generally. But the re-
cently enunciated law does permit practices which preserve associa-
tion rights reasonably necessary to the association purpose.
We do not go along entirely with Justice Clark's fear that the new
guidelines will be a "green light" to other groups which would intrude
into the practice of law, but we do see them as an "amber light" to
the profession, a caveat which the Bar as an institution well might heed.
For example, the legal profession for years failed to furnish expertise
in the growing complexity of the income tax laws, with the result that
today the tax practitioner, the CPA and the estate planner has come
to dominate those areas of activity. Likewise, in the area of Labor Law,
lawyers generally have failed to acquire the expertise in this complex
field. So we find many employers turning to management consultants
and so-called "labor consultants" for assistance. And the Bar is poorer
for it. Labor organizations have developed expertise from among their
own ranks. The National Labor Relations Board explicitly recognizes
the right of laymen to practice before it, even in unfair labor practice
proceedings in making a record on which the NLRB and the circuit
courts will act.7 4 The answer would seem to lie in the responsibility of
the Bar to furnish the necessary legal services, else we will see further
advance of group plans even over the opposition of the Bar, such as
occurred in Railroad Trainmen.75
73 Winkler, Legal Assistance for Armed Forces, 50 Amer. Bar Assoc. J. 451 (1964).
74 Sec. 102.44 of the NLRB Rules and Regulations, whereby aggravated misconduct,
when engaged in by an attorney or "other representative of a party," shall be ground
for suspension or disbarment by the Board from further practice before it.
75 Brotherhood v. Virginia, supra note 3. The position of the Brotherhood of Rail-
road Trainmen was opposed by motion for rehearing by the American Bar Associ-
ation, 44 State Bar Associations and four major local bar associations.
Jan. 1969
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol18/iss1/2
PRAGMATIC GROUP LAW PRACTICE
The grounding by the court of its conclusions on constitutional
rights, in our opinion, makes it clear that the rights in the three cases
do not rest alone on the peculiar interests of the NAACP or the two
unions, for constitutional rights are not peculiar to any specific group.
Thus, if a group of landlords band together for mutual aid and protec-
tion, might they not furnish to their members, under the principles
stated, legal services to vindicate their rights? Or a tenants' association?
Or a group of ship-owners? Or even an association of automobile own-
ers (a conclusion which might cause concern among the plaintiff per-
sonal injury bar)? And whether we denominate it as such, group prac-
tice actually is in effect in that important area. For insured defendants
generally are provided with group legal services by their insurors, be-
cause of the financial interest of the insuror in the outcome of the liti-
gation. And plaintiffs, particularly in some areas, are afforded a type
of group practice through the custom of general practitioners referring
personal injury litigation to firms specially skilled in plaintiff's personal
injury practice. The problem now is one of extent, not of principle.
We thus look at the stated major objections to such group prac-
tices.
1. Oppressive Lawsuits-Traditionally the Canons have sought to
discourage "oppressive lawsuits," which in Button the court implied
should be distinguished from other litigation. But that distinction makes
little sense except in a blatant case. There is nothing "oppressive" in any
legitimate lawsuit regardless of the small sum involved. That is the
theory of Legal Assistance Plans, of the Poverty Program and the small
claims courts. For it now is the national purpose to provide adequate
counsel to all persons regardless of their ability to pay. Numerous small
lawsuits well might crowd the court's docket, but that too is just another
problem which the Bar must help meet. For, cumulatively, grave in-
justices are permitted merely because poor people don't have the
money to litigate and their grievances remain unredressed under the
traditional scheme.
In Button the court referred to possible encouragement of divorce
suits, claims of adverse possession, multiple suits against a small com-
pany and suits calculated to harass debtor. But can we say that a
divorce guit should be avoided at whatever cost to the social relation-
ship? Or that adverse possession, recognized as a principle of law, is
inherently wrong? Or that suits against corporations should be dis-
couraged merely because they might be profuse? It would seem that
denial of counsel in itself becomes "oppression." And, of course, the
suit to harass a debtor is best handled by availability of counsel to the
debtor so that he might protect himself. If the suit is indeed "op-
pressive," then the Canons provide adequate means to handle this
problem on an ad hoc basis.
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2. Lack of Personal Attention-It well might be that a group prac-
tice might provide a different type of relationship than existed under
the old "family lawyer" system. However, the criticism is not unlike
that of the medical profession's emphasis on retention of the so-called
sacred doctor-patient relationship as an excuse for opposing group medi-
cal plans and "medicare." But we now have group medical plans and
Medicare and have not witnessed any reduction in the quality of care
furnished. There must be an element of "impersonality" in any plan
of furnishing mass services, but that is not more so than in the case of
the usual busy lawyer with many files in his office. These too must be
handled in expeditious fashion, with expertise required for the prob-
lem. The solution also is to be found in the Canons which place on the
lawyer the responsibility for handling his cases honorably and with
some dispatch. This problem, if it be a problem, too, can be con-
sidered on an ad hoc basis.
3. Solicitation of Representation-It is settled that the Brotherhood
and the Mine Workers plans are not "solicitation," even though the ap-
proved lawyers were the beneficiaries. That too can be handled under
the Canons, for if counsel had sought out the association for procure-
ment of legal "business," then the Bar surely would have successfully
challenged that form of misconduct, as it has many times. Here the
unions sought out the lawyers to perform a service for their members
and, as the court noted, the constitutional protections inherent to the
association also adhere to the lawyers. The lawyers did not seek out
the individual workers and solicit representation but rather they pro-
vided the services inherent in a plan of furnishing adequate representa-
tion of their members.
4. Conflicts of Interest-The concern that the individual lawyer
might find himself in a conflict of interest between the goals of the as-
sociation and the personal interest of the member is a question which
the lawyer, in his own conscience, must answer. But it is extremely
far-fetched to tar the plan itself with the "possibility" of a conflict, for
on the face of the plan it is apparent that no such conflict could exist.
What conflict can exist between the interest of an injured railroader or
miner to achieve an adequate award and the interest of the union that he
be properly compensated? Or between the interest of a Negro for non-
discriminatory treatment and the interest of NAACP that his school be
non-segregated. But in all of the plans the element of conflict was
avoided. In Railroad Trainmen the member was not forced to employ
approved counsel. In Mine Workers the lawyer even turned the file over
to such other lawyer whom the injured miner might desire. In Button
no one became a party to the suit unless he willingly did so and he even
later might withdraw. And all of the plans make it clear that the law-
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yer is in control of the case. But if conflict appear later in the suit, the
lawyer, of course, would resolve the conflict by withdrawal or referral.
5. Right of Layman to "Practice Law."-This criticism often has
been leveled at group plans, but that is inherent in any area of busi-
ness or of life. For example, there is no question but that the insurance
adjuster is "practicing law" in the sense that he applies legal principles
to his investigation and his negotiations for adjustment. And the trust
officer of a bank is "practicing law" in the sense that he applies legal
principles to his administering the trust. So a lay union compensation
committee member "practices law" in the sense that he investigates and
advises injured workmen and even appears for him at the hearing. But
the Ohio Supreme Court has held this practice permissible by laymen
if without payment of fee. The answer is that laymen, of course, prac-
tice law in a limited sense. Else society cannot function. But unless
the Bar rises to its role of providing legal services, then more laymen
will practice more law. This is evident in the eminence of accountants
in tax law practice and of "consultants" in labor law practice. But valid
channeling of the actual "legal practice" to qualified lawyers recom-
mended by associations under adequate restrictions seems preferable to
laymen taking over the field entirely should the Bar not meet its re-
sponsibilities.
Conclusion
The needs of the time place ever greater responsibility upon the
Bar, which must provide legal services to the public at prices it can
pay and still maintain its role as a learned profession with specific
Canons of professional conduct. We hereinbefore have described some
of the plans approved by the Supreme Court or which have arisen in-
formally as the result of the specific needs of an industrial society. The
Group Legal Services Committee of the California Bar has stated
caveats which should attach to such plans: 76
(1) A group which undertakes to provide legal service cannot be
organized solely for this purpose;
(2) There may be no group control over the attorney in areas
usually reserved for the attorney and client;
(3) There may be no direct or indirect kick-backs between the
attorney and the group;
(4) There must be scrupulous observation of conflicting interest
rules;
(5) Limitations are imposed upon the methods of publicizing the
attorney and his availability.
76 Progress report, Group Legal Services Committee of California State Bar, 723-24
(July 30, 1964).
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Item 5 is obscure, because there must be a systematic program of
bringing the right to legal services to the attention of the membership
for the plan to be successful. But we would make two further sug-
gestions-the plan should guarantee that the recommended or em-
ployed counsel possess diligence and expertise in the particular fields of
law involved, and there should be no solicitation by the lawyer to the as-
sociation for participation if the fee in the individual case is to be paid
by the employee.
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